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Introduction	  
Although	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  began	  signing	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (BITs)	  in	  the	  1970s,	  China’s	  negotiators	  removed	  the	  teeth	  from	  the	  early	  BITs.	  They	  prevented	  enforcement	  by	  blocking	  foreign	  investors	  from	  suing	  the	  host	  government	  in	  international	  courts.	  Since	  1998,	  interestingly,	  almost	  all	  Chinese	  BITs	  began	  to	  reject	  these	  restrictions	  and	  to	  allow	  foreign	  investors	  to	  bring	  governments	  before	  international	  arbitration	  tribunals.	  	  Some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  China	  reversed	  its	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  support	  Chinese	  overseas	  investors.	  	  Others	  suggest	  that	  China	  gave	  in	  to	  pressure	  from	  developed	  countries	  or	  the	  WTO,	  or	  that	  the	  move	  fit	  China’s	  general	  economic	  liberalization	  strategy.	  	  I	  argue	  against	  these	  theories,	  drawing	  upon	  evidence	  from	  China’s	  most	  recent	  BITs	  and	  arbitration	  cases.	  	  I	  suggest	  instead	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  chose	  to	  allow	  arbitration	  in	  BITs	  with	  small	  developing	  countries	  starting	  in	  1998	  as	  an	  experiment.	  Since	  European	  and	  American	  governments	  demanded	  open	  arbitration	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  signing	  new	  BITs	  with	  China,	  China	  began	  signing	  open	  BITs	  with	  smaller	  countries	  to	  test	  the	  risks	  it	  would	  face	  if	  it	  opened	  up	  to	  its	  largest	  investors.	  	  	  
I	  conclude	  by	  considering	  the	  implications	  of	  China’s	  recent	  treaty	  behavior	  on	  its	  future	  BITs.	  As	  international	  arbitration	  tribunals	  threaten	  China’s	  open	  access	  experiment,	  it	  has	  struggled	  to	  maintain	  what	  I	  call	  “bilateral	  sovereignty,”	  or	  the	  right	  to	  control	  its	  treaties	  bilaterally	  without	  interference	  from	  third-­‐party	  tribunals.	  China	  has	  added	  new	  provisions	  to	  its	  latest	  treaties	  to	  restrict	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international	  arbitrators’	  room	  for	  interpretation.	  China	  has	  adopted	  restrictions	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  American	  BITs,	  improving	  its	  prospects	  of	  concluding	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US.	  	  However,	  the	  US	  avoids	  BITs	  with	  capital-­‐exporting	  countries	  to	  protect	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  courts,	  and	  China	  now	  exports	  massive	  amounts	  of	  capital.	  	  The	  main	  obstacle	  to	  US-­‐China	  BIT	  negotiations	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  two	  nations’	  differences,	  but	  rather	  their	  similarities.	  	  
	  
China’s	  Turning	  Point	  in	  Offering	  Investor	  Access	  to	  Arbitration	  
Before	  1998,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  shielded	  itself	  from	  international	  liability	  by	  restricting	  private	  foreign	  investors’	  access	  to	  arbitration	  in	  every	  BIT’s	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  resolution	  clause.	  	  Investors	  could	  only	  bring	  governments	  to	  arbitration	  under	  these	  clauses	  if	  their	  dispute	  “involv[ed]	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  for	  expropriation.”1	  Like	  Soviet	  BITs,	  Chinese	  BITs	  restricted	  arbitration	  to	  maximize	  its	  control	  over	  and	  minimize	  its	  liability	  for	  all	  private	  assets	  invested	  in	  China.2	  
The	  Chinese	  government	  thus	  escaped	  accountability	  for	  its	  treaty	  violations.	  Investors	  relying	  on	  these	  old	  BITs	  could	  only	  sue	  for	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  Chinese	  courts.	  	  International	  tribunals	  worry	  that	  local	  court	  action	  allows	  “self-­‐determination”	  by	  the	  state,	  meaning	  that	  Chinese	  judges	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  rule	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  wording	  in	  these	  clauses	  varies	  slightly.	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  
2	  See	  for	  example	  USSR	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  BITs.	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against	  the	  Chinese	  state.3	  	  Indeed,	  international	  law	  scholar	  Wenhua	  Shan	  reported	  in	  2005	  that	  Chinese	  local	  courts	  still	  suffer	  from	  bribery,	  political	  interference,	  and	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  objectivity,	  although	  the	  government	  has	  recently	  mandated	  that	  any	  foreign	  lawsuit	  rejected	  in	  the	  lower	  courts	  must	  be	  automatically	  reviewed	  by	  the	  higher	  courts.4	  	  	  
Beginning	  in	  1998,	  Chinese	  negotiators	  deliberately	  permitted	  investors	  to	  bring	  governments	  to	  international	  arbitration	  for	  any	  violation	  of	  their	  country’s	  BIT.5	  	  The	  China-­‐Barbados	  BIT	  set	  the	  new	  standard	  for	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration:	  “If	  any	  dispute…	  cannot	  be	  settled	  within	  six	  months…	  the	  Investor	  shall	  have	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  to	  submit	  the	  dispute	  for	  resolution	  by	  international	  arbitration.”6	  China	  transplanted	  the	  wording	  to	  BITs	  with	  Bahrain,	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  (DRC),	  Botswana,	  Iran,	  Brunei,	  and	  eleven	  other	  countries	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2002.7	  	  	  
The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  weathered	  this	  policy	  change	  without	  a	  flood	  of	  lawsuits	  from	  foreign	  investors.	  International	  relations	  scholar	  Cui	  Yankun	  claims	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  expropriation	  in	  China	  today	  is	  “next	  to	  nothing.”8	  Meanwhile,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Renta	  4	  SVSA	  v.	  The	  Russian	  Federation,	  Arbitration	  Institute	  of	  the	  Stockholm	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  
Award	  on	  Preliminary	  Objections	  024/2007,	  20	  March	  2009,	  quoted	  in	  Luke	  Eric	  Peterson,	  “2.	  Holdings	  in	  
Spanish	  Shareholders’	  Yukos	  Claim	  Come	  to	  Light,”	  International	  Arbitration	  Reporter	  Vol.	  2	  No.	  6	  (17	  April	  
2009),	  6.	  
4	  Wenhua	  Shan,	  The	  Legal	  Framework	  of	  EU-­‐China	  Investment	  Relations	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2005),	  
256-­‐258.	  
5	  Exceptions	  include	  the	  China-­‐Ethiopia	  (1998),	  China-­‐Bahrain	  (1999),	  and	  China-­‐Qatar	  (1999)	  BITs.	  	  
Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  41,	  320.	  
6	  China-­‐Barbados	  (1998)	  BIT,	  Article	  9(2).	  
7	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  42.	  
8	  Cui	  Yangkun,	  “New	  Developments	  in	  China’s	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  (Zhongguo	  dijie	  shuangbian	  
touzi	  tiaoyue	  de	  xin	  fazhan),”	  Law	  and	  Society	  (Fazhi	  yu	  shehui)	  March	  2007,	  706.	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many	  Chinese	  companies	  can	  compete	  with	  foreign	  businesses,	  so	  loosening	  controls	  on	  the	  economy	  may	  actually	  help	  Chinese	  companies	  grow	  and	  increase	  their	  efficiency.	  Indeed,	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  Barbados	  BIT	  went	  into	  effect,	  no	  foreign	  investor	  has	  ever	  tried	  to	  bring	  the	  Chinese	  government	  before	  international	  arbitration.9	  Some	  scholars	  have	  warned	  that	  this	  investor-­‐state	  relationship	  is	  only	  a	  “honeymoon,”	  but	  the	  government	  has	  not	  given	  investors	  many	  excuses	  to	  spoil	  the	  occasion.	  
	  
The	  Going	  Abroad	  Explanation	  
Most	  observers	  have	  concluded	  that	  the	  government	  began	  promoting	  open	  international	  arbitration	  as	  part	  of	  its	  “Go	  Abroad”	  strategy	  to	  encourage	  private	  and	  state-­‐owned	  Chinese	  companies	  to	  invest	  overseas.	  In	  1998,	  President	  Jiang	  Zemin	  urged	  government	  officials	  to	  “study	  how	  to	  speed	  up	  measures	  to	  develop	  the	  ‘Going	  Abroad’	  strategy.	  	  Regions	  like	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Central	  Asia,	  and	  South	  America	  with	  large	  developing	  countries	  [have]	  very	  big	  markets	  and	  abundant	  resources;	  we	  should	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  get	  in.”10	  Axel	  Berger	  points	  out	  in	  support	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  in	  the	  1990s,	  China’s	  outward	  investment	  increased	  and	  it	  shifted	  toward	  signing	  BITs	  with	  developing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Some	  scholars	  speculate	  that	  the	  government	  could	  have	  kept	  a	  BIT	  dispute	  private.	  Nonetheless,	  
international	  law	  scholar	  Tao	  Jingzhou	  reports	  confidently	  that	  the	  Investment	  Law	  division	  of	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  assured	  him	  that	  China	  “has	  never	  been	  involved	  in	  arbitration	  arising	  from	  a	  BIT.”	  	  
Tao	  Jingzhou,	  Arbitration	  Law	  and	  Practice	  in	  China,	  2nd	  Edition	  (Frederick,	  MD:	  Wolters	  Kluwer,	  2008),	  17.	  
10	  Chen	  Yangyong.	  “The	  Shape	  and	  Significance	  of	  Jiang	  Zemin’s	  ‘Going	  Abroad’	  Policy	  (Jiang	  Zemin	  zou	  
chu	  qu	  zhanlüe	  de	  xingcheng	  jiqi	  zhongyao	  yiyi)”	  Literature	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (Dang	  de	  
wenxian)	  No.	  1	  (2009),	  http://politics.csscipaper.com/cpc/document/7350.html	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	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countries.11	  Scholars	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  China	  have	  credited	  open	  arbitration	  access	  to	  the	  “Going	  Abroad”	  strategy.12	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan’s	  landmark	  2010	  study	  of	  Chinese	  investment	  treaties	  does	  not	  advance	  this	  argument,	  but	  it	  does	  admit	  that	  “these	  changes	  are	  in	  line	  with	  China’s…	  increased	  amount	  of	  outward	  direct	  investment.”13	  
	   However,	  international	  law	  scholars	  all	  over	  China	  have	  criticized	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  “Going	  Abroad”	  strategy	  justifies	  granting	  investors	  the	  right	  to	  sue	  governments.	  In	  addition	  to	  benefiting	  Chinese	  investors,	  they	  warn,	  two-­‐way	  BITs	  give	  foreign	  investors	  the	  chance	  to	  win	  enormous	  arbitration	  awards	  from	  the	  Chinese	  government.	  Chinese	  academics	  have	  criticized	  not	  only	  the	  treaties	  but	  also	  the	  government	  for	  “lacking	  a	  clear	  understanding	  and	  high	  level	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Axel	  Berger,	  “China	  and	  the	  Global	  Governance	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment:	  The	  Emerging	  Liberal	  
Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty	  Approach,”	  German	  Development	  Institute	  Discussion	  Paper	  (Oct	  2008),	  24.	  
12	  Chinese	  sources	  include	  Fang	  Xun,	  “Research	  and	  Commentary	  on	  Chinese	  BITs	  under	  ICSID	  Jurisdiction	  
since	  1990	  (90	  niandai	  yilai	  zhongguo	  zai	  BITs	  zhong	  jieshou	  ICSID	  guanxia	  de	  yanjiu	  ji	  pingxi),”	  Law	  and	  
Society	  (Fazhi	  yu	  Shehui)	  Sept	  2010;	  	  
Chen	  An,	  “Distinguishing	  Two	  Types	  of	  Countries,”	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  Vol	  8	  No	  6	  (Dec	  
2007):	  775;	  	  
Zhan	  Weiling,	  “Analysis	  of	  International	  Investment	  Arbitration	  from	  China’s	  Perspective	  (Yi	  zhongguo	  
shijiao	  fenxi	  guoji	  touzi	  zhongcai)”	  People’s	  University	  Law	  School	  International	  Law	  Discussion	  30	  May	  
2010,	  http://www.rucil.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=1031	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
Foreign	  sources	  include	  the	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  “Evaluating	  a	  Potential	  US-­‐China	  Bilateral	  
Investment	  Treaty,”	  report	  prepared	  for	  the	  US-­‐China	  Economic	  and	  Security	  Review	  Commission,	  (30	  
March	  2010),	  http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2010/EIU_Report_on_US-­‐China_BIT-­‐-­‐
FINAL_14_April_2010.pdf	  (6	  Dec	  2010);	  	  
Elodie	  Dulac	  and	  John	  Savage,	  “The	  Asia	  Pacific	  Arbitration	  Review	  2007:	  China	  BITs,”	  Global	  Arbitration	  
Review,	  http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/2/sections/4/chapters/19/china-­‐bits/	  (6	  Dec	  
2010).	  
Michael	  Snarr	  argues	  that	  the	  open	  BITs	  encourage	  Chinese	  investors	  to	  invest	  in	  Europe.	  	  Michael	  S.	  
Snarr,	  “Making	  Progress	  BIT	  by	  BIT	  on	  a	  US-­‐China	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty,”	  China-­‐US	  Trade	  Law	  Blog	  
(2	  February	  2010),	  http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2010/02/articles/investment/making-­‐progress-­‐
bit-­‐by-­‐bit-­‐on-­‐a-­‐uschina-­‐bilateral-­‐investment-­‐treaty-­‐caaeaeeaecaaeaaeae/	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  	  
13	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  378.	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awareness.”14	  Chen	  An,	  China’s	  own	  nominee	  for	  arbitrator	  at	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID),	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  voices.15	  	  
	   Chen	  An	  and	  others	  argue	  that	  despite	  its	  “Going	  Abroad”	  strategy,	  China	  does	  not	  benefit	  from	  strengthening	  investors	  with	  arbitration	  access.	  	  First,	  Chinese	  investors	  may	  be	  going	  abroad	  in	  record	  numbers,	  but	  foreign	  investment	  into	  China	  still	  dwarfs	  Chinese	  investment	  abroad	  by	  at	  least	  four	  to	  one.16	  The	  United	  States	  invests	  more	  than	  50	  times	  as	  much	  in	  China	  as	  China	  invests	  in	  the	  US;	  for	  Japan	  this	  figure	  is	  over	  100	  times.17	  Though	  Axel	  Berger	  supports	  the	  “Going	  Abroad”	  theory,	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  when	  Chinese	  negotiators	  opened	  access	  to	  arbitration	  in	  1999,	  total	  inward	  FDI	  was	  over	  66	  times	  higher	  than	  outward	  FDI.18	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  while	  inward	  FDI	  is	  still	  larger,	  its	  dominance	  has	  shrunk	  considerably.	  Data	  from	  China’s	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  2009	  show	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  inward	  FDI	  to	  outward	  investment	  had	  dwindled	  to	  less	  than	  two	  to	  one,	  $90	  billion	  to	  $56.5	  billion	  by	  2009.19	  Chen	  An	  argued	  that	  China	  should	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Fang	  Xun,	  90.	  
15	  Chen	  An,	  “Should	  the	  four	  great	  safeguards	  in	  Sino-­‐Foreign	  BITs	  be	  hastily	  dismantled?”	  Journal	  of	  
World	  Investment	  and	  Trade,	  Vol	  7	  No	  6	  (Dec	  2006):	  899-­‐933;	  Chen	  An,	  “Distinguishing	  Two	  Types”	  
16	  Fang	  Xun,	  90	  
17	  Fang	  Xun,	  90.	  
18	  Berger,	  15.	  
19	  Inward	  FDI:	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  News	  Office	  (Shangwubu	  xinwen	  bangongshi),	  “The	  2009	  Situation	  of	  
Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  in	  China	  (2009	  nian	  1-­‐12	  yue	  quanguo	  xishou	  waishang	  zhijie	  touzi	  qingkuang),”	  
Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  Website	  (Zhonghua	  renmin	  gongheguo	  
shangwubu),	  15	  Jan	  2010,	  
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/tongjiziliao/v/201002/20100206785656.html	  	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
Outward	  investment:	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  “2009	  Statistical	  Bulletin	  of	  China’s	  Outward	  Foreign	  Direct	  
Investment	  (2009	  nian	  zhongguo	  duiwai	  zhijie	  touzi	  tongji	  gongbao),”	  Department	  of	  Outward	  Investment	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strengthen	  investors	  until	  outward	  investment	  equals	  inward	  investment,	  but	  that	  day	  is	  fast	  approaching.20	  For	  example,	  in	  2009	  Americans	  invested	  $3.6	  billion	  in	  China	  and	  received	  $908	  million	  in	  return,	  a	  ratio	  slightly	  less	  than	  four	  to	  one.21	  Japan	  invested	  $4.1	  and	  China	  returned	  only	  $84	  million,	  around	  fifty	  to	  one.22	  China	  is	  slowly	  balancing	  its	  investments	  to	  and	  from	  developed	  countries.	  
The	  Chinese	  government	  would	  not	  have	  opened	  arbitration	  access	  to	  encourage	  investors	  to	  go	  abroad	  because	  few	  investors	  cared	  about	  the	  treaties.	  Chinese	  companies	  respond	  to	  measures	  that	  affect	  their	  business	  directly	  and	  frequently,	  rather	  than	  measures	  that	  promise	  expensive,	  five-­‐year	  court	  cases	  with	  uncertain	  prospects	  for	  a	  favorable	  decision.	  According	  to	  Chen,	  Chinese	  companies	  do	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  BITs	  when	  making	  investment	  decisions.23	  	  Only	  eighteen	  percent	  of	  overseas	  investors	  knew	  whether	  they	  were	  investing	  under	  BITs	  with	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration.24	  In	  fact,	  Chinese	  investors	  moved	  abroad	  so	  rashly	  that	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  coined	  a	  special	  slogan:	  “Companies	  Going	  Abroad:	  Bravery	  Also	  Needs	  Caution.”25	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  Economic	  Cooperation	  Website	  (Duiwai	  zhijie	  touzi	  he	  jingji	  hezou	  si),	  13	  Sept	  2010,	  
http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
20	  Chen	  An,	  “Should	  the	  Four	  Great	  Safeguards	  in	  Sino-­‐Foreign	  BITs	  Be	  Hastily	  Dismantled?”	  Journal	  of	  
World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  Vol.	  7	  No.	  6	  (Dec	  2006),	  914.	  
21	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  News	  Office;	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  82.	  
22	  Ibid.,	  78.	  
23	  Chen	  An,	  “Four	  Great	  Safeguards,”	  917.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  918.	  
25	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  2009	  Order	  No.	  5	  (Zhonghua	  renmin	  gongheguo	  shangwubu	  ling	  2009	  nian	  di	  5	  
hao),	  “Management	  Measures	  for	  Investors	  Abroad	  (Jingwai	  touzi	  guanli	  banfa),”	  Xinhua	  News	  16	  Mar	  
2009,	  http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-­‐03/16/content_11021992.htm	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
Economic	  Information	  Newspaper	  (Jingji	  cankao	  bao),	  “Experts	  Suggest:	  Chinese	  Companies	  Going	  Abroad	  
Bravery	  Also	  Needs	  Caution	  (Zhuanjia	  jianyi:	  woguo	  qiye	  zouchuqu	  danda	  hai	  xu	  xinxi)”	  Xinhua	  News	  17	  
Mar	  2009,	  http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-­‐03/17/content_11023052.htm	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	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If	  the	  Chinese	  government	  simply	  wanted	  to	  encourage	  overseas	  investment,	  it	  had	  at	  its	  disposal	  a	  slew	  of	  safer,	  faster,	  and	  more	  effective	  options.	  Investors	  did	  not	  surge	  abroad	  when	  China	  ratified	  its	  first	  round	  of	  new	  BITs	  from	  1999	  to	  2003.	  	  They	  waited	  until	  2004,	  when	  the	  State	  Council	  replaced	  the	  old	  outward	  investment	  “examination	  regime”	  with	  a	  “registration	  requirement.”26	  By	  streamlining	  the	  outward	  investment	  process,	  the	  State	  Council	  exerted	  far	  more	  power	  at	  far	  less	  risk	  than	  when	  it	  negotiated	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  In	  2009,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  again	  pushed	  outward	  investment	  to	  new	  heights	  by	  granting	  investors	  taxation,	  insurance,	  foreign	  exchange,	  and	  residence	  permit	  (hukou)	  benefits.27	  If	  their	  goal	  were	  to	  encourage	  outward	  investment	  through	  open	  arbitration	  access,	  China’s	  negotiators	  chose	  a	  remarkably	  blunt	  and	  ill-­‐suited	  instrument.	  
Similarly,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  did	  not	  choose	  its	  new	  BIT	  partner	  countries	  to	  match	  the	  interests	  of	  Chinese	  overseas	  investors.	  	  If	  China	  had	  designed	  the	  new	  BITs	  to	  help	  its	  investors,	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  government	  to	  sign	  new	  treaties	  with	  Latin	  American	  and	  African	  countries	  receiving	  massive	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  to	  avoid	  BITs	  with	  developed	  countries	  investing	  in	  China.	  Its	  most	  important	  resource	  suppliers	  like	  Venezuela,	  Bolivia,	  and	  Argentina	  frequently	  nationalize	  private	  companies.	  China	  would	  suffer	  little	  risk	  in	  signing	  BITs	  with	  these	  countries,	  since	  almost	  none	  of	  their	  citizens	  invest	  in	  China.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  12.	  
27	  Invest	  in	  China	  Guide	  (Zhongguo	  zhinan),	  “Six	  Large-­‐Scale	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  Measures	  to	  Support	  
Companies	  Investing	  Overseas	  (Shangwubu	  liu	  da	  jucuo	  zhichi	  qiye	  duiwai	  touzi),”	  27	  Oct	  2009,	  
http://fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/tzdt/dt/t20091027_113505.htm?fclose=1	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	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Instead,	  China	  rushed	  to	  sign	  BITs	  with	  countries	  that	  received	  little	  Chinese	  investment.	  Berger	  points	  out	  that	  China	  shifted	  toward	  signing	  BITs	  with	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  1990s.28	  However,	  it	  signed	  with	  most	  of	  its	  developing	  country	  partners	  before	  the	  shift	  to	  open	  arbitration	  in	  1999.	  From	  1999	  to	  2003,	  China	  signed	  and	  ratified	  BITs	  almost	  exclusively	  with	  small	  developing	  countries	  that	  had	  little	  investment	  to	  or	  from	  China.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  “Going	  Abroad”	  theory	  cite	  these	  years	  as	  evidence	  of	  China	  protecting	  its	  investors.29	  China	  did	  choose	  to	  sign	  with	  fifteen	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America,	  Asia,	  and	  Africa,	  regions	  that	  constituted	  roughly	  90	  percent	  of	  China’s	  total	  outward	  investment.	  	  However,	  the	  specific	  countries	  that	  China	  chose	  accounted	  for	  zero	  Chinese	  investment	  in	  Latin	  America,	  a	  half	  of	  a	  percent	  of	  its	  investment	  in	  Asia,	  and	  two	  percent	  of	  its	  investment	  in	  Africa.30	  	  The	  Netherlands	  stands	  out	  as	  the	  only	  developed	  country	  to	  sign	  a	  BIT	  with	  China	  during	  this	  initial	  period.31	  After	  four	  years	  spent	  signing	  BITs	  mostly	  with	  developing	  countries,	  China	  renegotiated	  its	  old	  European	  BITs	  en	  
masse.	  	  After	  signing	  a	  BIT	  with	  Germany	  in	  2003,	  China	  signed	  eight	  more	  BITs	  with	  developed	  nations	  in	  less	  than	  two	  years.	  It	  concluded	  80	  percent	  of	  its	  2004-­‐05	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Berger,	  19.	  
29	  Fang	  Xun,	  90.	  
30	  The	  Africa	  figures	  omit	  Nigeria,	  a	  significant	  capital-­‐importer	  from	  China,	  because	  Nigeria’s	  2001	  BIT	  
came	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  the	  Chinese.	  They	  had	  signed	  a	  restricted	  BIT	  with	  Nigeria	  in	  1997,	  but	  the	  Nigerian	  
government	  failed	  to	  ratify	  it	  domestically.	  Ironically,	  when	  they	  returned	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  in	  2001,	  
they	  signed	  a	  BIT	  that	  was	  less	  favorable	  to	  Nigeria	  due	  to	  the	  open	  access	  provision.	  
Percents	  calculated	  from	  2003	  data	  in	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  “2009	  Statistical	  Bulletin,”	  78-­‐82.	  List	  of	  
open-­‐access	  BIT	  partners	  taken	  from	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  42.	  
31	  List	  from	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  42.	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BITs	  with	  developed	  countries	  that	  exported	  far	  more	  capital	  to	  China	  than	  they	  imported.32	  	  
China	  maintained	  its	  focus	  on	  developed	  country	  BITs	  by	  resuming	  negotiations	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  respectively.33	  The	  US	  negotiations	  had	  fallen	  apart	  in	  1989	  over	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  brutal	  response	  to	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  demonstrations.	  But	  even	  before	  Tiananmen,	  they	  had	  reached	  a	  stalemate	  since	  the	  Chinese	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  US’s	  unshakable	  requirement	  of	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration.34	  By	  finally	  offering	  the	  US	  side	  open	  arbitration,	  the	  Chinese	  side	  rekindled	  negotiations	  in	  2007.	  The	  Going	  Abroad	  Theory	  cannot	  explain	  why	  China	  would	  continue	  to	  pursue	  of	  open	  access	  BITs	  with	  capital	  exporters.	  	  
	  
Other	  Theories	  
Some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  China	  accepted	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  because	  developed	  countries	  and	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  forced	  China	  to	  accept	  new	  international	  economic	  norms.	  	  In	  their	  landmark	  2009	  study	  of	  Chinese	  BITs,	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  assert	  that	  China’s	  State	  Council	  first	  approved	  open	  access	  during	  BIT	  negotiations	  with	  Canada,	  meaning	  that	  “the	  breakthrough	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  List	  from	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  42.	  
33	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  383.	  
34	  Stephan	  Schill,	  “Tearing	  Down	  the	  Great	  Wall:	  The	  New	  Generation	  Investment	  Treaties	  of	  the	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China,”	  Cardozo	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Vol.	  15	  (2007):	  82;	  Chen	  An,	  
“Distinguishing	  Two	  Types,”	  773.	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was	  actually	  achieved	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Canadians	  in	  1997.”35	  	  Indeed,	  Canada	  could	  have	  exerted	  particularly	  great	  pressure	  on	  China	  because	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  had	  just	  slashed	  China’s	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves.36	  	  Similarly,	  scholars	  point	  out	  that	  when	  China	  joined	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001,	  the	  WTO	  forced	  it	  to	  eliminate	  some	  investment	  protections	  and	  pressured	  it	  to	  liberalize.37	  	  	  
The	  China-­‐Canada	  and	  China-­‐Germany	  BIT	  negotiations	  demonstrate	  that	  Chinese	  negotiators	  do	  respond	  to	  pressure	  from	  developing	  countries.	  German	  negotiators	  persuaded	  China	  to	  remove	  key	  phrases	  safeguarding	  “local	  laws	  and	  regulations”	  that	  appear	  in	  all	  other	  Chinese	  BITs.38	  Two	  months	  later,	  China	  reinstated	  these	  phrases	  into	  its	  next	  BIT	  and	  never	  allowed	  another	  country	  to	  remove	  them.	  	  China’s	  quick	  change	  of	  heart	  suggests	  that	  the	  Germans	  successfully	  pressured	  them	  into	  removing	  the	  clauses.	  	  
However,	  China	  did	  not	  cave	  in	  to	  foreign	  pressure	  over	  access	  to	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration,	  a	  point	  illustrated	  by	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  chose	  to	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  at	  a	  moment	  when	  no	  developed	  countries	  could	  have	  forced	  its	  hand.	  	  China	  and	  Canada	  broke	  off	  BIT	  negotiations	  in	  1997	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis,	  though	  China	  soon	  recovered	  comfortable	  levels	  of	  foreign	  exchange.	  	  In	  1998,	  the	  Chinese	  State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  41.	  
36	  Ken	  Davies,	  “China’s	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves,	  1977-­‐2010,”	  Chinability	  Blog,	  
http://www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
37	  Schill,	  99;	  Cui	  Yankun,	  706;	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  320.	  
38	  Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  China-­‐Germany	  BIT	  omits	  “subject	  to	  local	  laws	  and	  regulations”	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  
investment,	  while	  Article	  2(1)	  lacks	  the	  usual	  requirement	  to	  “Admit	  such	  investment	  in	  accordance	  with	  
its	  laws	  and	  regulations.”	  	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  National	  Treatment	  clause	  also	  excludes	  the	  usual	  caveat.	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Council	  suddenly	  chose	  to	  approve	  a	  request	  by	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  negotiators	  to	  grant	  open	  arbitration	  in	  the	  Suriname	  BIT.	  	  Although	  the	  1998	  Suriname	  BIT	  fell	  through,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  used	  the	  State	  Council’s	  approval	  to	  sign	  open	  access	  into	  the	  Barbados	  BIT	  in	  1999.	  	  Chinese	  negotiators	  have	  agreed	  to	  open	  access	  in	  almost	  every	  BIT	  since	  then.	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  credit	  China’s	  “more	  liberal	  policy	  since	  joining	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001,”	  but	  China	  signed	  open	  arbitration	  clauses	  before	  entering	  the	  WTO.39	  
Unable	  to	  pin	  down	  any	  truly	  decisive	  factor,	  scholars	  also	  credit	  the	  change	  to	  China’s	  broader	  effort	  to	  open	  up	  its	  economy,	  facilitate	  inward	  and	  outward	  investment,	  and	  show	  greater	  respect	  for	  international	  treaties.40	  The	  German	  negotiators	  to	  the	  China-­‐Germany	  BIT	  reported	  that	  the	  Chinese	  side	  had	  itself	  demanded	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  because	  it	  was	  determined	  to	  provide	  “the	  international	  standard	  of	  investment	  protection.”41	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  suggest	  that	  China	  slowly	  accepted	  international	  law	  on	  many	  fronts	  around	  that	  time,	  granting	  BIT	  access	  to	  arbitration	  as	  part	  of	  that	  trend.	  China’s	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  “was	  no	  doubt	  influenced	  by	  several	  factors,	  including	  China’s	  ratification	  of	  the	  ICSID	  Convention	  in	  1993,	  its	  more	  liberal	  policy	  towards	  international	  law	  and	  international	  commitments	  since	  joining	  the	  WTO	  in	  2001,	  and	  its	  definite	  shift	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  320.	  
40	  Schill,	  99-­‐100.	  
41	  Schill,	  43.	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policy	  towards	  international	  arbitration.”42	  	  They	  identify	  Chinese	  policies	  as	  liberal	  but	  cannot	  explain	  why	  the	  government	  was	  motivated	  to	  liberalize	  its	  policies.	  
The	  Chinese	  government	  did	  not	  open	  up	  to	  arbitration	  as	  part	  of	  a	  general	  trend;	  it	  must	  have	  had	  a	  compelling	  reason.	  China	  slowly	  developed	  market-­‐based	  socialism	  and	  joined	  the	  WTO	  because	  each	  offered	  clear	  economic	  benefits,	  but	  open	  arbitration	  does	  not	  offer	  any	  proven	  economic	  benefit.	  Susan	  Franck	  agrees	  with	  protectionist	  Chinese	  scholars	  that	  “the	  specific	  impact	  of	  investment	  treaty	  arbitration	  is…	  unclear.”43	  
	  
Recent	  Evidence:	  China	  Holds	  Back	  
	   	  One	  final,	  contrary	  clue	  is	  that	  although	  the	  Chinese	  government	  seems	  eager	  to	  sign	  an	  open	  BIT	  with	  any	  individual	  country,	  it	  has	  blocked	  attempts	  to	  retroactively	  open	  its	  remaining	  old	  BITs.	  In	  three	  separate	  ways,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  fought	  to	  prevent	  international	  arbitration	  tribunals	  from	  granting	  open	  access	  to	  all	  the	  countries	  still	  left	  with	  restrictive	  Chinese	  BITs.	  	  
First,	  in	  2006,	  arbitration	  tribunals	  hinted	  that	  a	  foreigner	  investing	  under	  an	  old	  BIT	  might	  be	  able	  to	  sue	  the	  government	  through	  the	  “Most	  Favored	  Nation”	  clause.	  	  Investors	  can	  claim	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  (MFN)	  clause	  if	  they	  are	  treated	  worse	  than	  investors	  from	  a	  third	  nation.	  Numerous	  investors	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  320.	  
43	  Susan	  Franck,	  “Foreign	  Direct	  Investment,	  Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration,	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,”	  Global	  
Business	  and	  Development	  Law	  Journal	  Vol.	  19,	  (2007):	  373.	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attempted	  to	  use	  MFN	  claims	  to	  replace	  a	  specific	  clause	  in	  their	  treaty	  with	  a	  more	  favorable	  BIT	  signed	  by	  the	  host	  government.	  	  The	  arbitration	  community	  is	  deeply	  divided;	  Lochnie	  Hsu	  reports	  that	  “[t]he	  smorgasbord	  of	  decisions	  [on	  MFN	  clauses]	  cannot	  be	  fully	  reconciled.”44	  	  Tribunals	  found	  in	  Plama	  v	  Bulgaria,	  Berschader	  v	  
Russia,	  Telenor	  v	  Hungary,	  and	  Wintershall	  v	  Argentina	  that	  the	  MFN	  clause	  has	  to	  specifically	  enumerate	  the	  areas	  that	  it	  protects.45	  	  The	  Renta	  4	  v.	  Russa	  and	  
RosInvest	  Co.	  v	  Russia	  tribunals	  found	  that	  the	  MFN	  clause	  has	  to	  explicitly	  exclude	  any	  areas	  that	  it	  does	  not	  cover.46	  	  Chinese	  treaty	  experts	  noticed	  the	  RosInvest	  precedents,	  which	  could	  allow	  investors	  with	  restrictive	  Chinese	  BITs	  to	  automatically	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  new,	  open	  BIT.47	  	  
Chinese	  negotiators	  have	  responded	  to	  these	  cases	  in	  China’s	  most	  recent	  BITs	  by	  restricting	  the	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  clause	  from	  applying	  to	  arbitration.	  	  First,	  China’s	  2008	  BIT	  with	  Mexico	  restricts	  MFN	  treatment	  to	  “the	  operation,	  management,	  maintenance,	  use,	  enjoyment,	  or	  disposal	  of	  investments.”48	  Because	  this	  BIT	  does	  not	  explicitly	  include	  or	  exclude	  dispute	  resolution,	  the	  Plama,	  
Berschader,	  Telenor,	  and	  Wintershall	  tribunals	  would	  reject	  jurisdiction	  over	  MFN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Lochnie	  Hsu,	  “MFN	  and	  Dispute	  Settlement:	  When	  the	  Twain	  Meet,”	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  &	  
Trade	  Vol.7	  No.	  1,	  (February	  2006):	  25-­‐37.	  
45	  Plama	  Consortium	  Limited	  v.	  Bulgaria,	  ICSID	  Decision	  on	  Jurisdiction,	  Case	  No.	  ARB/03/24	  (8	  Feb	  2005);	  
Berschader	  v.	  Russia,	  SCC	  Award,	  Case	  No.	  080/2004	  (21	  Apr	  2006);	  Telenor	  Mobile	  Communications	  A.S.	  
v.	  Republic	  of	  Hungary,	  ICSID	  Award,	  Case	  No.	  ARB/04/15	  (13	  Sept	  2006);	  Wintershall	  Aktiengesellschaft	  
v.	  Argentine	  Republic,	  ICSID	  Award,	  Case	  No.	  ARB/04/14,	  (8	  Dec	  2008),	  
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/alphabetical_list_content.htm	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
46	  Renta	  4	  S.V.S.A	  et	  al.	  v.	  Russian	  Federation,	  SCC	  Award	  on	  Preliminary	  Objections,	  Case	  No.	  24/2007	  (20	  
Mar	  2009);	  RosInvestCo	  UK	  Ltd.	  v.	  The	  Russian	  Federation,	  SCC	  Award	  on	  Jurisdiction,	  Case	  No.	  Arb.	  
V079/2005	  (Oct	  2007),	  http://ita.law.uvic.ca/alphabetical_list_content.htm	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
47	  Xu	  Chongli,	  “From	  Substance	  to	  Process:	  Dispute	  over	  the	  Scope	  of	  Use	  of	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  
Treatment	  (Cong	  shiti	  dao	  chengxu:	  zuihuiguo	  daiyu	  shiyong	  fanwei	  zhi	  zheng),”	  Law	  and	  Business	  
Research	  (Fasheng	  yanjiu)	  Vol.	  2,	  2007.	  
48	  China-­‐Mexico	  BIT	  2008,	  Article	  4(1),	  in	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  515.	  
	   16	  
cases	  brought	  under	  this	  BIT,	  while	  the	  Renta	  and	  RosInvest	  tribunals	  might	  allow	  the	  case.49	  	  However,	  the	  investor	  treatment	  clause	  in	  the	  2008	  Colombia-­‐China	  BIT	  explicitly	  states	  that	  “this	  treaty’s	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  treatment	  rules	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  any	  treaty-­‐based	  investment	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanism,	  such	  as	  the	  rules	  from	  this	  treaty’s	  8th	  and	  9th	  Articles.”50	  No	  arbitration	  tribunal	  could	  find	  jurisdiction	  to	  hear	  a	  MFN	  case	  from	  this	  BIT.	  China	  is	  attempting	  to	  ban	  restricted-­‐BIT	  investors	  from	  gaining	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  through	  the	  back	  door,	  so	  to	  speak.	  
Second,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  taken	  measures	  to	  block	  investors	  from	  stealing	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration	  through	  “shell	  companies.”	  Investors	  have	  figured	  out	  that	  they	  can	  invest	  in	  restricted-­‐BIT	  countries	  through	  fake	  company	  offices,	  even	  just	  a	  mailbox,	  in	  a	  third-­‐party	  country	  with	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  Then	  international	  tribunals	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  file	  claims	  under	  the	  third-­‐party	  country’s	  BIT	  with	  the	  host	  country	  rather	  than	  under	  China’s	  restricted	  BIT.51	  	  
China	  attempted	  to	  stop	  this	  so-­‐called	  “treaty	  shopping”	  by	  applying	  their	  BITs	  only	  to	  companies	  with	  “substantial”	  investment.	  Its	  2008	  Mexico	  and	  Colombia	  BITs	  require	  a	  company	  investor	  to	  be	  “constituted	  or	  otherwise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Though	  the	  Renta	  and	  RosInvest	  tribunals	  argue	  that	  one	  would	  still	  have	  to	  consider	  other	  factors	  
before	  borrowing	  provisions	  from	  another	  treaty,	  including	  the	  general	  versus	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	  
original	  provisions	  the	  investor	  sought	  to	  replace.	  
50	  China-­‐Colombia	  BIT	  (Zhonghua	  renmin	  gongheguo	  zhengfu	  he	  gelunbiya	  gongheguo	  zhengfu	  guanyu	  
cujin	  he	  baohu	  touzi	  de	  shuangbian	  xieding),	  22	  Nov	  1998,	  Article	  3(3)，	  
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=eag&Gid=100670197	  (3	  Dec	  2010).	  	  	  
Note:	  The	  Colombian	  Senate	  just	  ratified	  the	  BIT	  in	  late	  October.	  Yongxian	  Huang,	  “Colombian	  Senate	  
ratifies	  Sino-­‐Columbian	  Investment	  Treaty	  (Gelunbiya	  can	  yiyuan	  pizhun	  gezhong	  touzi	  baohu	  xieding),”	  
Xinhua	  News	  	  27	  Oct	  2010,	  http://news.ifeng.com/world/detail_2010_10/27/2913388_0.shtml	  (6	  Dec	  
2010).	  
51	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  81.	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organized	  under	  the	  law	  of	  a	  Contracting	  Party”	  and	  “engaged	  in	  substantive	  business	  operations	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  that	  Contracting	  Party.”52	  China	  is	  again	  attempting	  to	  ban	  investors	  in	  restricted-­‐BIT	  countries	  from	  stealing	  open	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  	  This	  effort	  will	  only	  succeed,	  however,	  if	  other	  countries	  use	  similar	  language	  to	  prevent	  Chinese	  investors	  from	  suing	  under	  their	  BITs.	  
Finally,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  argued	  against	  its	  own	  citizen	  to	  prevent	  an	  international	  tribunal	  from	  hearing	  an	  expropriation	  case	  under	  a	  restricted	  BIT.	  In	  2007	  a	  Hong	  Kong	  investor	  named	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  attempted	  to	  bring	  expropriation	  charges	  against	  Peru	  at	  ICSID,	  the	  first	  time	  an	  investor	  has	  ever	  filed	  an	  international	  arbitration	  case	  under	  a	  Chinese	  BIT.	  He	  did	  this	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  1994	  China-­‐Peru	  BIT	  specifically	  restricts	  disputes	  to	  those	  “involving	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  for	  expropriation.”53	  To	  assist	  Peru	  in	  its	  defense	  and	  thereby	  ensure	  that	  the	  tribunal	  did	  not	  find	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case,	  China	  sent	  one	  of	  the	  original	  negotiators	  of	  the	  BIT,	  a	  team	  of	  international	  law	  scholars,	  and	  thousands	  of	  pages	  of	  court	  documents.54	  Fan	  Jianghong,	  the	  Chinese	  negotiator,	  testified	  that	  China	  had	  intended	  this	  clause	  to	  prevent	  international	  arbitrators	  from	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  state	  had	  expropriated	  a	  given	  investor’s	  assets.55	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  China-­‐Mexico	  BIT	  2008,	  Article	  1(a);	  China-­‐Colombia	  BIT	  2008,	  Article	  1(2).	  
53	  1994	  China-­‐Peru	  BIT,	  Article	  8(3).	  
54	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v.	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  ICSID	  Decision	  on	  Jurisdiction	  and	  Competence,	  Case	  No.	  ARB/07/6	  
(19	  Jun	  2009),	  http://www.transnational-­‐dispute-­‐management.com/article.asp?key=1576	  (6	  Dec	  2010);	  
Chen	  An,	  “Queries	  to	  the	  Recent	  ICSID	  Decision	  on	  Jurisdiction	  Upon	  the	  Case	  of	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v.	  Republic	  
of	  Peru,”	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  Vol	  10	  No	  6	  (Dec	  2009):	  861.	  
55	  Fan	  Jianghong,	  Witness	  Statement,	  10	  Sept	  2009,	  at	  para.	  24,	  in	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  Republic	  of	  Peru,	  38.	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However,	  the	  tribunal	  found	  for	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum,	  against	  both	  China	  and	  Peru.	  	  It	  determined	  that	  the	  word	  “involving”	  cast	  doubt	  on	  China’s	  intentions	  according	  to	  the	  Vienna	  Convention’s	  guidelines	  on	  interpreting	  treaties.	  It	  argued	  that	  any	  investor	  who	  sued	  the	  state	  for	  expropriation	  in	  local	  courts	  would	  be	  shut	  off	  from	  subsequent	  international	  arbitration	  by	  the	  “fork-­‐in-­‐the-­‐road	  clause.”	  	  Since	  the	  BIT’s	  preamble	  pledges	  to	  “encourage	  investment,”	  the	  tribunal	  argued	  that	  the	  BIT	  must	  allow	  some	  form	  of	  dispute	  resolution,	  and	  thus	  it	  must	  allow	  entire	  expropriation	  cases.	  It	  rejected	  the	  Chinese	  argument	  that	  China	  had	  clarified	  its	  intentions	  through	  a	  clear	  “official	  policy,”	  though	  almost	  every	  old	  BIT	  contained	  a	  similar	  provision	  and	  many	  international	  scholars	  believe	  in	  such	  a	  policy.56	  	  The	  decision	  drew	  upon	  precedent	  from	  a	  similar	  wording-­‐based	  decision	  in	  European	  
Media	  Ventures	  v.	  Czech	  Republic.57	  	  
Chinese	  scholars	  were	  outraged	  by	  the	  tribunal’s	  decision.	  Chen	  wrote	  that	  the	  decision	  came	  to	  the	  “great	  surprise	  of	  Chinese	  scholars.”	  These	  scholars,	  including	  Chen,	  wrote	  a	  flurry	  of	  articles	  protesting	  it.58	  	  
The	  Chinese	  government	  voiced	  its	  own	  protest	  by	  writing	  a	  new	  clause	  into	  its	  latest	  BITs	  that	  will	  block	  similar	  cases	  in	  the	  future.	  China’s	  negotiators	  inserted	  a	  brand-­‐new	  clause	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  China-­‐Colombia	  BIT	  that	  would	  have	  ensured	  that	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  could	  not	  access	  international	  arbitration.	  The	  clause	  requires	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Chen	  An,	  “Queries	  to	  the	  Recent	  ICSID	  Decision,”	  847-­‐8;	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  Decision.	  
57	  European	  Media	  Ventures	  SA	  v.	  Czech	  Republic,	  UNCITRAL	  Award	  on	  Jurisdiction	  (15	  May	  2007),	  
unpublished	  but	  reviewed	  in	  The	  Czech	  Republic	  v.	  European	  Media	  Ventures	  SA	  [2007]	  EWHC	  2851.	  
58	  Chen	  An,	  “Queries	  to	  the	  Recent	  ICSID	  Decision,”	  831;	  Wang	  Nan,	  “The	  Problem	  of	  Using	  China’s	  
Foreign	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties	  Toward	  Hong	  Kong	  (Zhongwai	  shuangbian	  touzi	  xieding	  dui	  
xianggang	  de	  shiyong	  wenti),”	  20	  Apr	  2010.	  
	   19	  
investors	  who	  claim	  that	  the	  government	  expropriated	  their	  assets	  using	  taxes	  to	  first	  argue	  their	  case	  with	  the	  host	  government’s	  tax	  department,	  then	  allow	  their	  home	  government	  to	  decide	  if	  the	  taxation	  was	  actually	  tantamount	  to	  expropriation.59	  Since	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  had	  claimed	  that	  the	  Peruvian	  government	  unjustly	  froze	  his	  assets	  for	  tax	  violations,	  this	  clause	  would	  have	  given	  the	  Chinese	  government	  a	  chance	  to	  throw	  out	  his	  case.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  China	  essentially	  wrote	  this	  provision,	  not	  Colombia,	  because	  China	  allows	  its	  partners	  little	  influence	  over	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  BITs.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Peruvian	  negotiators	  testified	  during	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  v	  Peru,	  “the	  negotiations	  between	  Peru	  and	  China	  were	  substantially	  based	  on	  the	  Chinese	  draft	  of	  the	  BIT.”60	  Thus	  China	  responded	  specifically	  to	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  by	  blocking	  his	  strategy	  in	  its	  later	  BITs.	  
	  
An	  Experiment	  in	  Open	  Access	  
A	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  China’s	  decision	  on	  arbitration	  should	  address	  four	  puzzles:	  the	  government’s	  timing,	  BIT	  partner	  country	  selection,	  sacrifice	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  recent	  efforts	  to	  stop	  universal	  open	  BIT	  access.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  chose	  to	  begin	  testing	  open	  arbitration	  on	  small	  developing	  countries	  in	  1998	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  for	  impending	  negotiations	  with	  developed	  countries	  that	  demanded	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  “Tax	  Measures	  (Shuishou	  cuoshi),”	  Article	  14(5),	  China-­‐Colombia	  2008	  BIT	  	  
60	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  decision,	  37.	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First,	  this	  experiment	  with	  smaller	  countries	  would	  explain	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  particular	  timing	  and	  partner	  country	  selection,	  which	  did	  not	  match	  its	  Going	  Abroad	  strategy.	  	  For	  the	  first	  four	  years,	  the	  government	  only	  signed	  new	  treaties	  with	  small	  developing	  countries	  and	  a	  safe	  European	  country,	  the	  Netherlands,	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  experiment’s	  risk.	  With	  no	  arbitration	  cases	  in	  its	  first	  four	  years,	  China	  began	  to	  renegotiate	  its	  BITs	  with	  European	  countries	  from	  2003-­‐2006.	  These	  European	  BITs	  had	  finished	  their	  first	  10-­‐	  or	  15-­‐year	  terms	  around	  1999.	  Thus	  the	  European	  governments	  had	  probably	  been	  pressuring	  the	  Chinese	  government	  to	  renegotiate	  its	  BIT	  since	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Surinam/Barbados	  decision.	  	  
Still	  free	  from	  arbitration	  cases,	  the	  government	  began	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Canadians	  and	  US	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  With	  no	  disputes	  in	  nine	  years,	  it	  offered	  open	  access	  to	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  aware	  that	  neither	  country	  would	  sign	  a	  BIT	  without	  this	  key	  clause.61	  One	  Chinese	  scholar	  even	  argued	  that	  the	  US	  and	  China	  would	  quickly	  sign	  the	  BIT	  now	  that	  China	  had	  eliminated	  the	  arbitration	  roadblock.62	  	  So	  the	  timing	  and	  partner	  country	  selection	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  an	  incremental	  experiment:	  first,	  China	  tested	  the	  new	  open	  BITs	  on	  small	  developing	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  study	  the	  risks	  of	  opening	  renegotiated	  European	  BITs;	  second,	  it	  renegotiated	  open	  European	  BITs	  to	  test	  the	  waters	  for	  open	  BITs	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Canada.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan	  note	  that	  these	  are	  the	  two	  “toughest”	  BITs	  for	  China	  to	  negotiate	  because	  of	  this	  
requirement	  and	  the	  length	  of	  their	  usual	  BITs.	  Gallagher	  and	  Shan,	  384.	  
62	  See	  Cai	  Congyuan,	  “China-­‐-­‐US	  BIT	  Negotiations	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Investment	  Treaty	  Regime:	  A	  Grand	  
Bilateral	  Bargain	  with	  Multilateral	  Implications,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economic	  Law,	  Vol.	  12	  No.	  2	  
(2009):	  457-­‐506,	  http://econpapers.repec.org/article/oupjieclw/	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	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The	  Chinese	  government	  relinquished	  domestic	  sovereignty	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  from	  new	  BITs	  with	  capital-­‐exporting	  countries.	  While	  opening	  access	  to	  arbitration	  alone	  does	  not	  spark	  a	  flood	  of	  investment,	  it	  offered	  China	  the	  chance	  to	  conclude	  new	  BITs	  that	  would	  most	  likely	  increase	  both	  inward	  and	  outward	  investment	  flows.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  was	  eager	  to	  discover	  the	  benefits	  that	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US,	  one	  of	  its	  largest	  and	  most	  recalcitrant	  investment	  partners,	  could	  provide.	  
This	  arbitration	  experiment	  has	  many	  precedents	  in	  China’s	  cautious	  path	  of	  economic	  reform.	  Grandfathers	  of	  reform	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  and	  Chen	  Yun	  have	  famously	  advocated	  “Crossing	  the	  river	  while	  feeling	  for	  the	  stones.”	  The	  government	  began	  incrementally	  reforming	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  from	  1979	  onward,	  increasing	  the	  state’s	  grain	  prices,	  then	  allowing	  above-­‐quota	  grain	  sales	  on	  the	  market,	  and	  finally	  abolishing	  the	  state	  monopoly	  purchasing	  system.	  The	  central	  government	  allowed	  local	  officials	  to	  form	  township	  and	  village	  enterprises,	  slowly	  relinquished	  the	  sectoral	  monopolies	  held	  by	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs),	  and	  finally	  began	  privatizing	  the	  lowest-­‐performing	  SOEs.	  In	  each	  area	  of	  its	  domestic	  economy,	  China	  has	  been	  gradually	  experimenting.	  It	  should	  not	  be	  such	  a	  surprise	  that	  it	  might	  also	  “feel	  for	  the	  stones”	  in	  liberalizing	  its	  BITs.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  blocks	  retroactive	  opening	  of	  all	  its	  old	  BITs	  because	  it	  is	  still	  testing	  open	  arbitration.	  The	  2008	  Mexico	  and	  Colombia	  BITs	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  government	  is	  still	  adjusting	  its	  approach	  to	  arbitration.	  Since	  the	  government	  has	  not	  yet	  settled	  firmly	  on	  arbitration,	  as	  most	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observers	  assume,	  it	  resists	  the	  universal	  conversion	  of	  its	  more	  than	  eighty	  remaining	  BITs	  that	  still	  restrict	  arbitration.	  Among	  these	  restricted	  BIT	  partners	  are	  large	  capital	  exporters,	  most	  notably	  the	  UK	  and	  Japan.	  
Instead	  of	  individual	  countries,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  worried	  about	  the	  epistemic	  community	  of	  lawyers,	  arbitrators,	  and	  scholars	  who	  influence	  the	  decisions	  of	  international	  arbitration	  tribunals.	  Although	  each	  BIT	  is	  negotiated	  between	  only	  two	  countries,	  the	  international	  disputes	  are	  all	  settled	  by	  ICSID,	  Stockholm	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  UNCITRAL	  and	  other	  tribunals	  which	  rely	  heavily	  on	  precedents	  from	  other	  tribunals’	  judgments	  on	  other	  countries’	  BITs.63	  The	  parties	  select	  their	  lawyers	  and	  arbitrators	  freely,	  however,	  a	  few	  popular	  individuals	  are	  recycled	  continually	  through	  both	  positions.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  head	  arbitrator	  of	  Renta	  v	  Russia	  runs	  the	  law	  firm	  that	  represented	  Berschader	  in	  
Berschader	  v	  Russia.64	  Another	  of	  the	  three	  Renta	  arbitrators	  had	  represented	  EMV	  in	  EMV	  v	  Czech	  Republic.65	  Renta’s	  lawyer	  has	  represented	  at	  least	  two	  other	  investors	  in	  recent	  MFN	  cases.66	  This	  is	  only	  a	  quick	  survey	  of	  the	  scholars	  involved	  in	  Renta	  that	  have	  appeared	  in	  other	  recent	  MFN	  cases.	  	  
Chinese	  and	  other	  scholars	  have	  been	  worried	  by	  ICSID	  and	  the	  international	  arbitration	  community’s	  broad	  BIT	  interpretations	  since	  long	  before	  Tza	  Yap	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Jeswald	  Salacuse,	  The	  Law	  of	  Investment	  Treaties	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010):13-­‐14.	  
64	  Renta	  Decision;	  Berschader	  Decision.	  
65	  Renta	  Decision;	  EMV	  Decision.	  
66	  Siemens	  v	  Argentina;	  Austrian	  Airlines	  v	  Slovak	  Republic	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Shum.67	  	  Chen	  Wenzhu,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  ICSID	  is	  guilty	  of	  “serious	  abuse.”68	  Uglješa	  Grušic	  shows	  that	  ICSID	  tribunals	  consistently	  give	  liberal	  interpretations	  that	  expand	  its	  jurisdiction.69	  However,	  she	  argues	  that	  these	  decisions	  “reflect	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties”	  because	  they	  support	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  investment	  instruments,	  which	  is	  to	  promote	  and	  protect	  investments.”70	  Still,	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Peruvian	  governments	  agreed	  on	  how	  the	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  tribunal	  should	  have	  interpreted	  the	  wording	  of	  their	  BIT,	  but	  the	  tribunal	  contradicted	  them.	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  these	  rulings	  may	  reflect	  the	  parties’	  original	  intentions	  often,	  but	  not	  always.	  	  
	  
Implications	  for	  China-­‐US	  BIT	  Negotiations	  
	   The	  open	  access	  experiment	  theory	  outlined	  above	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  China’s	  future	  BIT	  negotiations.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  negotiators	  were	  hoping,	  their	  experimentation	  with	  new,	  liberal	  provisions	  makes	  a	  China-­‐US	  BIT	  more	  likely.	  However,	  blocking	  retroactive	  opening	  by	  international	  courts	  also	  impacts	  the	  China-­‐US	  BIT.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Yu	  Jingsong,	  “The	  Recent	  Development	  and	  Effects	  of	  China’s	  International	  Investment	  Treaties	  (Guoji	  
touzi	  xieding	  de	  jinqi	  fazhan	  ji	  dui	  zhongguo	  de	  yingxiang),”Legal	  Expert	  (Faxuejia),	  Mar	  2006;	  Zuo	  Yanjun,	  
“Research	  into	  Problems	  of	  ICSID’s	  Jurisdiction	  over	  BITs	  (BIT	  zhong	  yu	  ICSID	  guanxiaquan	  youguan	  wenti	  
de	  tanjiu),”	  CNKI	  Database	  (Jul	  2010),	  http://www.docin.com/p-­‐12137840.html	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
68	  Chen	  Wenzhu,	  “Investigation	  into	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  ICSID	  Arbitration	  Mechanism,	  (ICSID	  zhongcai	  jizhi	  
gaige	  yanjiu),”	  Law	  View	  (Fazhi	  zaixian),	  CNKI	  Database,	  (6	  Dec	  2010). 
69	  Uglješa	  Grušic,	  “The	  Evolving	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  
Disputes,”	  Journal	  of	  World	  Investment	  and	  Trade	  Vol	  10	  No	  1	  (Feb	  2009):	  100.	  
70	  Ibid,	  100.	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China	  is	  struggling	  not	  for	  state	  sovereignty	  but	  for	  “bilateral	  sovereignty”—the	  power	  to	  sign	  BITs	  without	  ceding	  international	  tribunals	  space	  to	  broadly	  interpret	  the	  BIT	  provisions.	  As	  China	  gives	  up	  some	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  context	  of	  these	  BITs,	  it	  at	  least	  expects	  to	  make	  the	  rules	  governing	  this	  loss	  of	  sovereignty.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  strongly	  opposes	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  third	  actor,	  the	  epistemic	  community.	  The	  most	  recent	  China-­‐Mexico	  and	  China-­‐Colombia	  BITs	  show	  China’s	  willingness	  to	  uphold	  liberal	  measures,	  but	  also	  its	  determination	  to	  specifically	  curtail	  the	  space	  of	  the	  epistemic	  community.	  Instead	  of	  blocking	  arbitration	  directly,	  China	  attacked	  the	  tribunals’	  power	  by	  limiting	  the	  MFN	  clause	  and	  imposing	  the	  new	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum-­‐inspired	  tax	  dispute	  procedure.	  
China	  may	  have	  more	  success	  securing	  its	  bilateral	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  future	  because	  it	  has	  begun	  to	  copy	  new	  protectionist	  measures	  designed	  by	  the	  veteran	  US	  negotiators.	  	  Until	  now,	  China	  has	  struggled	  to	  define	  its	  intentions	  and	  close	  loopholes	  which	  expose	  it	  to	  legal	  interpretations	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  epistemic	  community,	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  dispute	  over	  the	  word	  “involving.”	  But	  China	  has	  begun	  to	  copy	  the	  time-­‐tested	  treaties	  of	  the	  US.	  For	  example,	  the	  China-­‐Colombia	  BIT	  for	  the	  first	  time	  copies	  the	  US	  provision	  on	  exceptions	  for	  “essential	  security.”	  Chen	  An	  recommended	  this	  measure	  in	  order	  to	  buffer	  China’s	  BITs	  against	  the	  creeping	  jurisdiction	  of	  international	  tribunals.71	  China	  also	  copied	  the	  new	  Colombia	  BIT	  tax	  provision	  from	  the	  US’s	  own	  taxation	  provisions.72	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Chen	  An,	  “Four	  Great	  Safeguards,”	  911.	  
72	  See	  for	  example	  the	  2000	  US-­‐Honduras	  BIT,	  Article	  XIII.	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Chinese	  scholars	  have	  discussed	  other	  protections	  commonly	  used	  by	  the	  US,	  such	  as	  differentiating	  treatment	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries.	  	  Multiple	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  China	  could	  restrict	  arbitration	  for	  developed	  countries	  while	  allowing	  open	  BITs	  with	  developing	  countries.73	  Yet,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  severely	  limit	  its	  MFN	  clauses	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  developed-­‐country	  investors	  from	  simply	  borrowing	  these	  more	  advantageous	  terms	  used	  in	  developing	  country	  BITs.	  	  This	  proposal	  imitates	  the	  US	  strategy	  of	  confining	  its	  BITs	  to	  developing	  countries	  so	  that	  only	  the	  few	  outward	  investors	  from	  these	  countries	  have	  the	  right	  to	  sue	  the	  US	  government.74	  Interestingly,	  other	  Chinese	  scholars	  have	  criticized	  differentiated	  treatment	  of	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  because	  it	  could	  damage	  China’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  leader	  among	  developing	  countries.	  	  
Since	  China	  seeks	  to	  align	  itself	  with	  BITs	  based	  on	  the	  US	  model,	  not	  only	  to	  conclude	  a	  US-­‐China	  BIT	  but	  also	  to	  secure	  its	  bilateral	  sovereignty,	  it	  has	  improved	  the	  chances	  of	  successful	  US-­‐China	  BIT	  negotiations.	  	  American	  scholars	  suggest	  that	  the	  BIT	  negotiations	  are	  not	  promising	  because	  the	  US	  brings	  a	  43-­‐article	  model	  BIT	  to	  the	  table,	  far	  more	  detailed	  than	  China’s.	  But	  the	  detailed	  provisions	  of	  the	  US	  BIT	  would	  also	  benefit	  Chinese	  capital	  exporters.	  Zhao	  Jun	  argues	  that	  since	  China	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Chen	  An	  “Distinguishing	  Two	  Types	  of	  Countries”;	  Zhao	  Jun,	  “Discussion	  on	  Broadening	  the	  Usage	  of	  BIT	  
MFN	  Clauses	  for	  Procedural	  Matters	  (Lun	  shuangbian	  touzi	  tiaoyue	  zuihuiguo	  daiyu	  tiaokuan	  kuozhang	  
shiyong	  yu	  chengxuxing	  shixiang),”	  CNKI	  Database	  (6	  Dec	  2010).	  
China	  could	  also	  fine-­‐tune	  its	  treaties	  to	  the	  new	  standard	  set	  by	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Area	  of	  the	  Americas	  
(FTAA),	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  specific	  MFN	  court	  case	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  its	  disagreement	  with	  that	  decision.	  
74	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  7.	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the	  US	  are	  now	  both	  major	  capital-­‐exporters	  and	  –importers,	  “the	  knife	  cuts	  both	  ways”	  and	  thus	  China	  should	  remain	  calm	  in	  the	  negotiations.75	  	  
Indeed,	  China	  has	  recently	  shown	  interest	  in	  standard	  US	  provisions	  it	  had	  previously	  avoided.	  One	  such	  area	  is	  environmental	  and	  labor	  standards.	  	  While	  the	  Chinese	  had	  previously	  avoided	  all	  mention	  of	  environment	  and	  labor	  concerns,	  its	  2003	  Guyana	  BIT	  mentions	  environmental	  protection	  in	  the	  Preamble.76	  Even	  more	  surprising,	  the	  2008	  China-­‐Colombia	  BIT’s	  new	  “essential	  security”	  clause	  mentions	  that	  environmental	  protection	  could	  justify	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  BIT’s	  other	  provisions.77	  
China’s	  shift	  toward	  the	  US	  BIT	  model	  may	  improve	  its	  chances	  of	  concluding	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US,	  except	  that	  the	  US	  has	  thus	  far	  only	  signed	  BITs	  with	  capital-­‐importing	  countries.	  The	  US	  government	  avoids	  signing	  BITs	  with	  capital-­‐exporting	  countries	  to	  protect	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  national	  courts.78	  	  Thus	  the	  main	  obstacle	  to	  US-­‐China	  BIT	  negotiations	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  two	  nations’	  differences,	  but	  rather	  their	  similarities.	  China	  faces	  an	  uphill	  battle	  because	  it	  exports	  hundreds	  of	  times	  more	  capital	  to	  the	  US	  than	  it	  did	  during	  the	  previous	  negotiations	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Ironically,	  the	  US	  may	  balk	  at	  agreeing	  to	  open	  arbitration	  with	  China,	  although	  China	  changed	  its	  policy	  in	  part	  to	  please	  the	  US.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Zhao	  Nan,	  2.	  
76	  China-­‐Guyana	  2003	  BIT,	  Preamble.	  
77	  China-­‐Colombia	  2008	  BIT,	  Article	  5.	  	  
China	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  eliminating	  performance	  requirements	  as	  required	  by	  the	  WTO	  TRIMS	  
Agreement,	  though	  Chinese	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  ways	  to	  get	  around	  it.	  
Zhao	  Jun，2.	  
78	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  7.	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China	  might	  actually	  improve	  its	  chances	  of	  concluding	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US	  if	  it	  convinces	  the	  US	  to	  restrict	  the	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  	  The	  US	  could	  then	  sign	  its	  first	  BIT	  with	  a	  capital-­‐exporter	  without	  compromising	  the	  exclusive	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  US	  courts.	  The	  US	  would	  not	  restrict	  arbitration	  in	  its	  treaties	  with	  developing	  countries,	  while	  European	  countries	  would	  not	  restrict	  arbitration	  for	  any	  treaties.	  	  Thus	  the	  US	  would	  need	  to	  differentiate	  the	  China	  BIT	  from	  its	  other	  BITs,	  which	  would	  require	  excluding	  access	  to	  arbitration	  from	  the	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  clause.	  	  	  
If	  the	  US	  or	  China	  did	  indeed	  begin	  to	  differentiate	  its	  treaties	  between	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries,	  the	  new	  BITs	  would	  deepen	  inequalities	  inherent	  ind	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations	  process.	  	  This	  would	  strike	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  global	  equality	  of	  the	  entire	  bilateral	  investment	  treaty	  system.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  damage	  that	  differentiation	  would	  do	  to	  the	  global	  BIT	  network	  could	  finally	  push	  developing	  countries	  to	  unite	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  nondiscriminatory	  multilateral	  investment	  treaty.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Previous	  scholars	  have	  not	  convincingly	  explained	  why	  China	  began	  accepting	  international	  investor-­‐state	  arbitration	  in	  1998.	  	  China’s	  most	  recent	  BITs	  and	  the	  Tza	  Yap	  Shum	  arbitration	  case	  show	  that	  China	  still	  opposes	  giving	  all	  its	  BIT	  partners	  access	  to	  arbitration.	  Thus	  their	  actions	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  	  “Going	  Abroad”	  strategy,	  WTO	  and	  developed	  country	  pressure,	  or	  China’s	  general	  economic	  liberalization.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  accepted	  open	  arbitration	  but	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continues	  to	  oppose	  universal	  access	  because	  it	  is	  experimenting.	  It	  chose	  to	  test	  open	  arbitration	  on	  small	  developing	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  study	  the	  risks	  of	  renegotiating	  European	  BITs	  and	  signing	  new	  ones	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Canada.	  	  
Today,	  rather	  than	  avoiding	  universal	  access	  because	  of	  any	  one	  particular	  country,	  China	  is	  trying	  to	  reserve	  its	  right	  to	  deny	  open	  access	  in	  future	  BITs.	  Thus	  China	  seeks	  to	  prevent	  international	  arbitration	  tribunals	  from	  establishing	  a	  precedent	  would	  allow	  all	  of	  its	  BIT	  partners	  open	  access.	  China	  has	  added	  new	  provisions	  to	  its	  latest	  treaties	  to	  restrict	  international	  arbitrators’	  room	  for	  interpretation.	  It	  is	  attempting	  to	  maintain	  its	  “bilateral	  sovereignty,”	  or	  the	  right	  to	  share	  power	  with	  its	  partner	  countries	  without	  the	  interference	  of	  international	  tribunals.	  	  
China	  has	  begun	  to	  protect	  itself	  against	  international	  tribunals	  by	  adopting	  the	  same	  protections	  used	  in	  American	  BITs.	  Therefore,	  it	  now	  faces	  better	  prospects	  of	  concluding	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  US.	  	  However,	  the	  US	  avoids	  BITs	  with	  capital-­‐exporting	  countries	  to	  protect	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  courts,	  and	  China	  is	  now	  a	  capital-­‐exporter.	  	  The	  main	  obstacle	  to	  US-­‐China	  BIT	  negotiations	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  two	  nations’	  differences,	  but	  rather	  their	  similarities.	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